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Abstract
Phelps (1994) presented the case for a low-wage subsidy policy.
Since the mid-1990s, France has experimented with this strategy. This
paper evaluates the effect of this policy on employment and also on
output and welfare. We construct an equilibrium search model incor-
porating wage posting and specific human capital investment, where
unemployment and the distribution of both wages and productivity
are endogenous. We estimate this model using French data. Numeri-
cal simulations show that the prevailing minimum wage allows a high
production level to be reached by increasing training investment, even
though the optimal minimum wage is lower. We show that payroll
tax subsidies enhance welfare more than a reduction in the minimum
wage when they are spread over a large range of wages in order to
avoid specialization in low productivity jobs.
JEL codes : C51, J24, J31, J38
Keywords: Employment, productivity, equilibrium search, labor
costs
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Introduction
High labor costs typically are considered the primary cause for high unem-
ployment levels in continental European countries (see Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000)) where the welfare state has put in place high payroll taxes and min-
imum wages. Despite a lack of formal evidence evaluating this claim (Katz
(1996)), Phelps (1994) presented a case for a low-wage employment subsidy
policy as a means to reduce the unemployment of such workers. Phelps
(1994) proposed “a system of low-wage employment subsidies be introduced,
a subsidy to every qualifying firm based on the stock of low-wage workers on
its roll” (p. 56, Phelps (1994)). This policy differs from most of the prevail-
ing subsidy policies1: for instance, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit in effect in
the US during all of the 1979 to 1994 period concerned hirings, as in most
developed countries. However, France had already implemented the original
strategy, which consists of a high minimum wage2 compensated for by large,
permanent payroll tax subsidies on low wage employment. It must be noted
that the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium, have also experimented with
such permanent subsidies for disadvantaged workers, but to a lesser extent
than in France.
In this paper, we use French data to evaluate the performance of this
wage subsidy policy suggested by Phelps (1994). Relative to a minimum
wage reduction policy, a wage subsidy implies a budgetary cost, but it may
preserve the welfare of the low-wage workers. On the other hand, this labor
cost-reducing policy may be implemented with two different options for a
given budgetary cost: either it concentrates subsidies at the minimum wage
or it spreads them over a large range of wages. The former clearly aims at
dampening the negative effect on employment of the minimum wage, but
risks introducing severe distortions. For instance, Katz (1996) emphasizes
the risk of stigmatization against a narrowly targeted population of workers
which could explain the low employment impact of subsidy policies. In this
paper, as firms are likely to respond to wage subsidies by increasing their
utilization of workers in the targeted population, we focus on the risk of dis-
tortion in job allocations and its implication in terms of productivity. While
several econometric papers have already highlighted the positive impact of
1A wage subsidy can be applied to all employment, to net changes in employment or
to new hires.
2France has the highest minimum wage/average wage ratio (known as the Kaitz ratio)
in Europe: it is equal to 55%, whereas all the other European countries have a ratio lower
than 50%. Research on the French labor market has pointed out extensively the negative
role played by the minimum wage legislation due to increasing labor costs (for instance
Laroque and Salanie´ (2000) and (2002)).
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this policy on employment in France (for example, Kramarz and Philippon
(2001) and Cre´pon and Desplatz (2002)), Malinvaud (1998), however, stresses
a potential negative impact on productivity due to a bias in job creation at
the bottom of the wage distribution. When the wage distribution is strongly
interrelated with the productivity distribution, payroll tax subsidies could
shrink productivity, which in turn could dampen output. Figure 1 shows a
higher concentration at the bottom of the wage distribution of manual work-
ers after the setting up in 1995 of the subsidy policy.3 Crepon and Desplatz
(2002) also provide some empirical evidences on the decrease of productivity.
Figure 1: Observed Wage Distributions of Manual Workers (France)
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In this paper, we propose a wage posting model with specific human
capital investments and a bilateral endogenous search including on-the-job
search, in the line of Mortensen (2000). This framework generates wage
and productivity distributions and an equilibrium unemployment rate that
are consistent with the data4. In our framework, the expected job duration,
3We retain only full-time manual workers from the Labor Force Survey (“Enqueˆte
emploi”) provided by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
(INSEE), as in the empirical part of our study. We estimate the wage distribution using a
wage set of N ∈ [14, 100; 14, 400] individuals: the size of this vector (N) varies every year,
but the difference is not significant.
4In our model, as is usual in equilibrium search models, the probability of job-to-job
transitions declines as one moves up the wage distribution. Yet, Bowlus and Neumann
(2004) provide some empirical evidence against this prediction based on the existence of
negative wage changes for high wage workers. By focusing on low-skilled workers, we avoid
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which depends on the degree of labor market tightness, determines the extent
to which firms invest in specific human capital. Beyond a pure distribution
effect due to the policy bias towards the low-paid workers, productivity could
also be decreased by less investment in specific human capital from firms
because lower labor costs reduce the expected job duration. Our model leads
to a joint theory of wages, productivity and employment, where the effect of
labor market institutions such as the minimum wage are not determined a
priori by job creation disincentives or the reduction of the monopsony power
of firms. Moreover, contrary to Flinn and Mabli (2006), the average job-
search efficiency is not necessarily improved when unemployment increases.
By allowing for the existence of transition periods between short-term and
long-term unemployment, the average job-search efficiency of unemployed
workers varies with the endogenous ratio of short-term unemployment to
long-term unemployment. This ratio depends on the number of vacancies,
which is in turn influenced by the average job-search efficiency. This creates
a potential interplay between labor supply and labor demand which we view
as necessary to identify the overall impact of a decrease in labor costs.
We therefore propose a structural model of the French low-skilled workers
labor market that enables us to evaluate quantitatively the employment and
productivity effects of the French labor cost reducing policy. This structural
strategy differs from recent econometric exercises (see for instance Kramarz
and Philippon (2001) or Cre´pon and Desplatz (2002)). It also allows us
to conduct counterfactual policy experiments, and, in particular, study the
optimal range of wage levels that should be covered by such subsidies. In
contrast to the equilibrium search literature which seeks to match the existing
stationary wage distribution (Ridder and Van den Berg (1998), Bontemps,
Robin, and van den Berg (1999) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)), we
propose an equilibrium search model that is also suitable for policy analysis.
The equilibrium search literature traditionally proposes a theory of wage
distribution consistent with the labor market equilibrium. Even if firms and
workers are ex-ante identical, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that there
is a dispersed equilibrium wage distribution due to the existence of job-to-
job transitions. From an empirical point of view, Ridder and Van den Berg
(1998) Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999), or Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) show that it is necessary to add an exogenous productivity
distribution in order to match the observed data. Nevertheless, despite its
empirical performance, this framework has been rarely used to conduct pol-
icy evaluations. The notable exception is Ridder and Van den Berg (1998).
With exogenous heterogeneity in productivity, a decrease in the minimum
this problem.
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wage makes additional productivity segments profitable and increases the
number of firms in the economy. Due to composition effects, labor cost
changes influence average productivity. However, in models with exogenous
productivity, the productivity level in any firm is given, which limits the ef-
fect on average productivity. On the other hand, the labor demand side in
this literature is not well-suited to policy analysis as the firms’ hirings do not
depend on labor costs. Flinn (2006) extends the equilibrium search approach
in this direction by considering a stochastic matching model with Nash bar-
gaining. Flinn (2006) assumes an exogenous productivity distribution, does
not allow on-the-job search however, thus restricting search to unemployed
workers along the lines of Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Eckstein and Wolpin
(1990).
Our modeling strategy relies on three key assumptions: the wage post-
ing hypothesis, the absence of counter-offers and the fact that productivity
is governed by specific human capital investments.5 Manning (1993) argues
that bargaining cost considerations make the wage setting assumption not
restrictive for anonymous markets with low-skilled workers. While Shimer
(2006) points out that the equilibrium wage distribution is no longer unique
in wage bargaining models with on-the-job search, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and
Robin (2006) show that the introduction of renegotiation circumvents the
multiple equilibria outcome. Moreover, they estimate that the bargaining
power of the unskilled workers is small: the wage posting assumption cannot
be rejected. Our assumption regarding the absence of counter-offers6 is mo-
tivated by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004) who argue that it is optimal for
low productive firms not to commit to matching outside wage offers7. Con-
cerning the third assumption, the specific human capital, Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) show that the productivity differential across firms explains
about half of the French low-skilled wage variance. The remaining part is
due entirely to search friction, leaving no room for individual fixed effects.
We interpret this as the absence of a significant general human capital effect
for the low-skilled workers8. We also exclude physical capital from the analy-
5These points receive some support in Manning (2003).
6See also the (Mortensen 2003) criticism of counter-offers endorsed by Shimer (2006):
“unlike in the market for academic economists in the United States, making counteroffers
is not the norm in many labor markets”.
7This avoids the moral hazard problem created by workers who prefer to search more
intensively knowing that outside offers lead to wage increases.
8This is consistent with previous empirical microevidence along the lines of Lynch
(1992) and Black and Lynch (1996) who stress the significant role of specific firms’ in-
vestments in human capital in the distribution of workers’ wages and productivity. Inter-
national evidence shows that the returns of firm-provided training are significant: 2% in
Germany (see Pischke (1996)) and 12% in the US (Blanchflower and Lynch (1994)).
6
sis: Robin and Roux (2002) show that the introduction of physical capital
in a model a` la Burdett and Mortensen does not help match the observed
French wage distribution. Hence, we assume that the firms’ heterogeneity
observed in the data comes only from their various investments in specific
human capital.
A key implication of our theoretical framework is that the wage distrib-
ution will not display a point mass at the minimum wage. As can be seen
from Figure 1, this implication is validated on French data if one considers
only full-time workers (see also Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002))9. In con-
trast, Dares (2006) documents that part-time workers do exhibits a point
mass at the minimum wage. While such workers account for 40% of the den-
sity at the minimum wage, taking into account these part time jobs would
have introduced too many complexities and heterogeneities into our theo-
retical framework. Moreover, part-time jobs in France benefit from specific
policy arrangements, especially concerning the subsidy policy in question.
We therefore prefer to focus on a consistent worker population.
We estimate key parameters of the model on French data using an in-
direct inference method. Based on statistical tests, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the theoretical wage distribution is generated by the same
law as the observed one. In particular, because the productivity distribu-
tion plays a central role in the replication of the observed wage density, it
provides a powerful identification strategy to estimate the elasticity of pro-
ductivity relative to human capital investment. We show that this model
is able to better replicate the deformation of the wage distribution following
the low-wage subsidy policy than a traditional equilibrium search model with
exogenous productivity. Thus, while search models based on exogenous pro-
ductivity differences can replicate existing wage distribution, they are unable
to explain variations in such distributions owing to policy changes. This is
a key result which strongly supports the need to adopt a framework with
endogenous human capital investments when considering the impact of labor
cost-reducing policies.
Taking into account a costly human capital investment creates a potential
trade-off between employment and productivity. The investment channel
competes with the employment channel to determine the output effect of the
labor cost-reduction policies. As a benchmark case, we investigate the various
implications of a minimum wage change on output. The optimal level for a
9This question is a disputable empirical issue. Ridder and Van den Berg (1998) do not
observe a spike at the minimum wage when estimating the wage densities on Dutch data.
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) find that spikes are more prevalent for females than
for males in the US. On the contrary, Flinn (2006) favors the view that there is a spike in
the US.
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minimum wage seems to be slightly lower (by 12%) than the existing one:
a decrease in the minimum wage leads to an employment boost, partially
compensated by a decline in labor productivity. The investment channel
explains why the optimal minimum wage is relatively high which contrasts
with the result of Ridder and Van den Berg (1998) and to a lesser extent of
Flinn (2006).
We then evaluate the performance of the subsidy policy. Given that the
goal of the payroll tax subsidies is to reduce labor costs (without removing
the minimum wage legislation), we show that this policy leads to an employ-
ment boost which is offset in part by a deterioration in productivity. We
show that the current implementation of this policy in France is close to be
optimal owing to the fact that subsidies are allocated over a broad range of
wages and not only at the minimum wage level. Removing the investment
channel from the analysis leads to an opposite recommendation, namely to
concentrate exemptions at the minimum wage level. Our results thus imply
that the French policy of labor subsidies provides an efficient way of concili-
ating a higher employment level with maintaining the welfare of the low-wage
workers.
This paper is organized in three sections. Section 1 is devoted to the
presentation of the theoretical model. Section 2 presents the calibration and
empirical performances of the model. Quantitative results for different policy
experiments are discussed in Section 3.
1 The Theoretical Model
Our theoretical framework is based on the Mortensen (2000) equilibrium
search model with wage posting and training investment by firms. This
framework is extended in three ways. First, we take into account the transi-
tion between short- and long-term unemployment.10 Secondly, we introduce
heterogeneity in the search intensity of employees and short- and long-term
unemployed workers11. Finally, we incorporate the minimum wage legisla-
tion.
10See Albrecht and Vroman (2001) for a Pissarides (1990) style of matching model where
the heterogeneity of the reservation wages is due to the exclusion of some unemployed
workers from the unemployment benefit system. From an empirical point of view, half of
unemployed individuals are not eligible for the French unemployment benefit system, but
we qualify them as long-term unemployed for simplicity.
11As we focus on firms’ policies on wages and specific human capital investment (i.e.
hiring decisions), we do not introduce an endogenous search effort, contrary to Christensen,
Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Werwatz (2005).
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The total labor force is composed of employed workers, unemployed work-
ers entitled to unemployment benefits and unemployed workers excluded from
the compensation system but entitled to a minimum income. We assume that
these three components of the total labor force are not perfectly equivalent in
the matching process. An employed worker accepts any offer in excess of the
wage currently earned. Yet, all unemployed workers will accept the first offer
that is higher than the common reservation wage of their sub-group. Differ-
ences in unemployment benefit compensation levels and the intensity of the
job search process generate two distinct reservation wages in the economy.
Firms create “job sites” and each job is either vacant or filled. The
equilibrium level of vacancies is endogenously determined by a free entry
condition. For each job vacancy, firms also determine the associated wage
and firm-specific training offered.
In the remainder of this section, we begin by presenting the conditions
that characterize the equilibrium flows for the two unemployed worker pop-
ulations and for each job relative to a given wage of the distribution. Then,
we determine the reservation wages through the derivation of the optimal
behavior of workers. Based on the firm’s optimal decisions, we derive the
vacancy rate, the wage offer distribution and the human capital investment
distribution.
1.1 Labor Market Flows
1.1.1 Matching Technology
According to Pissarides (1990), the aggregate number of hirings, H, is deter-
mined by a conventional constant returns to scale matching technology:
H = h(v, hee + hsus + hlul)
where v is the number of vacancies, he ≥ 0, hs ≥ 0, hl ≥ 0 are the exoge-
nous search efficiencies (intensities) for employed workers and short-term and
long-term unemployed workers, represented (in number) by e, us and ul, re-
spectively. We normalize e + us + ul to 1 and we denote u ≡ us + ul and
h = hee + hsus + hlul.
If we set θ = v
h
as labor market tightness, the arrival rates of wage offers
for workers are :
• for the employees
heλ(θ) ≡ h
e
h
H
e + us + ul
= he
H
h
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• for the short-term unemployed
hsλ(θ) ≡ h
s
h
H
e + us + ul
= hs
H
h
• for the long-term unemployed
hlλ(θ) ≡ h
l
h
H
e + us + ul
= hl
H
h
Accordingly, the average duration of a spell before a wage offer contact is
1/(heλ(θ)) for the employees, 1/(hsλ(θ)) for the short-term unemployed and
1/(hlλ(θ)) for the long-term unemployed.
The transition rate at which vacant jobs are filled is:
q(θ) =
H
v
= h
(
1,
h
v
)
The average vacancy duration is thus 1/q(θ).
1.1.2 Entries and Exits from Unemployment
Let xs and xl denote the endogenous reservation wages of the short-term and
long-term unemployed, respectively. The steady state level of short-term
unemployment (us) is derived from the following equilibrium flows:
s(1− u)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = hsλ(θ) [1− F (xs)] us︸ ︷︷ ︸ + δus︸︷︷︸
firings hirings flow into
long-term
unemployment
where s ∈ [0, 1] is the exogenous job destruction rate, F (w) denotes the
distribution function of wage offers w and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of
short-term unemployed workers transitioning to long-term unemployment.
When δ is allowed to depend on the elapsed duration of unemployment, the
model becomes non-stationary. For simplicity, we assume stationarity with
δ constant as in Albrecht and Vroman (2001). The steady state level of
long-term unemployment (ul) is given by:
δus︸︷︷︸ = hlλ(θ) [1− F (xl)] ul︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow out of hirings
short-term
unemployment
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These equations show that the fraction of long-term unemployed in the
total unemployed population (ul/u) decreases with the tightness of the la-
bor market (θ): when θ increases, the expected duration of unemployment
decreases, as does the probability of becoming long-term unemployed.
1.1.3 Entries and Exits from Employment at or Less than Wage
w
Let G(w) denote the fraction of workers employed at or less than wage w.
This function is derived from the following equilibrium flows:
• If xl ≤ w < xs,
(1− u)G(w)heλ(θ) [1− F (w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸ + s(1− u)G(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = hlλ(θ)F (w)ul︸ ︷︷ ︸
volontary quits firings hirings
• If w ≥ xs,
heλ(θ) [1− F (w)] (1− u)G(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸ + s(1− u)G(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
volontary quits firings
= ushsλ(θ)F (w) + ulhlλ(θ)F (w)︸ ︷︷ ︸ − ushsλ(θ)F (xs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
potential rejections
hirings
1.2 Behaviors
1.2.1 Workers
The total income of workers is composed of labor market earnings and trans-
fers (government budget surplus and firms’ profits12) which are uniformly
distributed across households denoted by T . Let V n(w) denote the value
function for an employed worker who earns w, V us the value function for
a short-term unemployed person who is paid b unemployment benefits and
V ul the value function of a long-term unemployed individual who is paid a
minimum social income msi. These functions are solved by:
rV n(w) = u((1− tw)w + T ) + heλ(θ)
∫
w
[V n(w˜)− V n(w)] dF (w˜)− s [V n(w)− V us]
rV us = u(b + T ) + hsλ(θ)
∫
xs
[V n(w˜)− V us] dF (w˜)− δ [V us − V ul]
12These two variables are defined more precisely in a later section.
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rV ul = u(msi + T ) + hlλ(θ)
∫
xl
[
V n(w˜)− V ul] dF (w˜)
where r ≥ 0 and tw ∈ [0, 1] stand for the real interest rate and employees’
payroll taxes, respectively. The utility function u(·) is assumed to be a Con-
stant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) and takes into account risk aversion in
the determination of the reservation wage. The reservation wage policies xs
and xl are derived from the two conditions V
n(xs) = V
us and V n(xl) = V
ul.
1.2.2 Firms
Let k be the match specific investment per worker and f(k) the value of
worker productivity which is an increasing concave function of this invest-
ment. It is assumed that whenever an employed worker finds a job paying
more than w (voluntary quit), then the employer seeks another worker. When
an exogenous quit (destruction) occurs, the job receives no value. Hence, the
expected present value of the employer’s future flow of quasi-rent once a
worker is hired at wage w stated as J(w, k), solves:
rJ(w, k) = f(k)− (1 + tf (w))w − heλ(θ)[1− F (w)][J(w, k)− V ]− sJ(w, k)
where tf (w) ≥ 0 is the employer’s payroll taxes. This tax can be a function
of the wage when employment subsidies are introduced.
In turn, the asset value of a vacant job solves the continuous time Bellman
equation:
rV = max
w≥xl,k≥0
{η(w) [J(w, k)− pkk − V ]− γ}
where γ is the recruiting cost, pk stands for the relative price of one unit of
human capital, and η(w) is the probability that a vacancy with posted wage
w is filled. This probability is defined by:
η(w) =
Prob(e|ul)ul
v
+
Prob(e|us)us
v
+
Prob(e|e)(1− u)
v
where the first, second and third term shows the acceptance rate of a job offer,
respectively, for a long-term unemployed person, a short-term unemployed
worker and an employed worker. These probabilities are:
Prob(e|ul) = hlH
h
if w ≥ xl
Prob(e|us) =
{
hs H
h
if w ≥ xs
0 if w < xs
Prob(e|e) = heH
h
G(w)
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where G(w) is the fraction of employed workers with earnings equal to or
less than w. The probability functions of the reservation wages are given by:
η(w) =
H
v
[
hl
h
ul +
he
h
(1− u)G(w)
]
∀ w ∈ [xl, xs]
η(w) =
H
v
[
hl
h
ul +
hs
h
us +
he
h
(1− u)G(w)
]
∀ w ∈ [xs, w]
where H/v = λ(θ)/θ gives the probability of having a contact with a firm.
Free entry conditions at each wage level imply that V = 0 and expected
intertemporal profits are identical for w ≥ w, where w is the lowest wage
level offered. Actually, xl ≤ w, because it is not in the firms’ interest to offer
a wage rejected by all workers. Hence, labor market tightness θ, the wage
distribution function F (w) and firms’ investment in human capital k(w) can
be derived from the system of equations defined by:
γ = η(w)
[
max
k≥0
{J(w, k)− pkk}
]
∀w ≥ w (1)
with F (w) = 0. Employers have two reasons for offering a wage greater
than w. First, the firm’s acceptance rate (η(w)) increases with the wage
offer, since a higher wage is more attractive. Second, the firm’s retention
rate increases with the wage paid by limiting voluntary quits that lead to
an increase in J(w, k). The wage strategy implemented by firms is strongly
interrelated with human capital investment decisions.
As each employer pre-commits to both the wage offered and the specific
capital investment in the match, it is easy to show that the optimal invest-
ment solves:
f ′(k) = pk(r + s + h
eλ(θ)[1− F (w)]) =⇒ k = k(w) ∀w ≥ w (2)
Therefore, the level of specific human capital increases with the level of the
wage offer. Indeed, a higher wage reduces the probability that an employee
will accept job offers from other firms. The negative relationship between
wage and labor turnover creates incentives to train employees. When the
wage is high, the expected duration of the match is longer and the period
during which the firm can recoup its investment increases. Therefore, firm-
specific productivity increases with wages.
1.3 Labor Market Equilibrium
Assumptions on Production Technology
We assume that the production function satisfies the following restrictions:
f ′(0) = ∞, f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(0) < 0.
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Equilibrium Definition and Properties
A steady state search matching equilibrium defines a reservation wage policy,
{xs, xl}, a vacancy rate (v = θh), a long-term unemployment rate ul, a short-
term unemployment rate uc, a wage offer distribution F (w) and a specific
human capital investment function k(w). Appendix A presents the system
of equations to solve this equilibrium in more detail.
Proposition 1 There is only one strictly positive level of vacancy
rate.
See Appendix B.1 for the formal proof of this proposition, which extends
Mortensen (2000)’s work.
Proposition 2 There is a wage interval [wl, xs[ over which there
is no wage offer.
Appendix B.2 shows a detailed proof. This equilibrium property suggests
that, over [wl, xs[, the increase in temporary profits associated with a decrease
in wages does not compensate for the loss due to higher rotation costs in the
long-term unemployed worker segment.
Corollary If wl > xl, then the support of the wage distribution
is formed by two subsets [xl, wl]∪[xs, w]. Otherwise, all posted wages
are included in the set [xs, w].
This suggests that, if wl < xl, the increase in temporary profits when
offering a wage lower than xs is never compensated by the loss due to higher
rotation costs.
The introduction of hiring costs implies that ex ante identical firms have
the same strictly positive expected profits. As shown in Quercioli (2005),
this ensures a unique wage offer distribution with no atoms.13 The proofs
provided in Appendix B are satisfied for all payroll tax rules.
The Incidence of a Minimum Wage
The introduction of a minimum wage (mw) may affect the properties of the
equilibrium in the following ways:
• If the minimum wage is lower than xl, it is not a constraint;
• If the minimum wage is greater than xs, its value is the lower posted
wage: w = mw;
13Without hiring costs, the expected equilibrium profit could be equal to zero. In this
case, Quercioli (2005) shows that multiple equilibria can occur.
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• If the minimum wage is included in ]xl, wl[ then w = mw;
• If the minimum wage is included in ]wl, xs[, then w = xs; or
• If wl < xl then w = max{xs,mw}.
1.4 Efficiency
To evaluate the impact of labor market policies on the equilibrium, we first
focus on the steady state aggregate output flow net of the recruiting costs,
as defined by:
Y = (1− u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∫ w
w
f(k(w))dG(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸ − γv︸︷︷︸
Employment (E)× Productivity (P)︸ ︷︷ ︸ Hiring
costs
gross output
− pkhsλ(θ)us
∫ w
w
k(w)dF (w)︸ ︷︷ ︸ − pkhlλ(θ)ul
∫ w
w
k(w)dF (w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
training costs training costs
short-term unemployed long-term unemployed
− pkheλ(θ)(1− u)
∫ w
w
(∫ w
w
k(w)dF (w)
)
dG(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
training costs
job-to-job mobility
Average productivity P may vary in the model due to a distribution
effect dG(w), but also because of less investment k(w) from firms in specific
human capital for any wages w. In models with exogenous productivity, the
productivity level in any firm is given, which limits the effect on average
productivity to a pure distribution effect.
Taking into account a costly human capital investment creates a poten-
tial trade-off between employment and productivity. The higher the labor
market tension, the higher the employment. The increase in the probabilities
of a firm contacting a worker increases hirings as in a traditional matching
model, but, by increasing job-to-job transitions, this leads to two antago-
nistic effects on average productivity. More job-to-job transitions tend to
concentrate the earnings distribution more to the right, increasing the pro-
ductivity by a pure distribution effect. Hereafter we refer to a job-to-job
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transition effect. However, as the expected job duration decreases, the re-
turn on the human capital investments diminishes, leading to a decrease in
the average productivity by an “investment effect”. Let us emphasize that
this investment effect, not only impacts on the level of capital, but also on
its distribution, as the capital decreases more at the bottom of the job dis-
tribution where firms particularly fear job turnover. These two effects will
compete with employment variations to determine the output impact of the
labor cost-reduction policies examined in the next section.
We also compute aggregate welfare, which takes into account the risk
aversion of workers and the distributive implications of different reforms.
Here, we plan to capture the variations in the relative situation of workers
and their impact on aggregate welfare for a degree of concavity given by the
utility function u:
W = (1− u)
(∫ w
w
V n(w)dG(w)
)
+ usV us + ulV ul
This implies the need to determine the variations in the government budget
surplus (B) and firms’ profits (Π) as well as the way they are distributed
across households. We assume that they are uniformly redistributed via
lump-sum transfers across all agents so as to not interfere with the direct
distributive effects of policy reforms. As the size of the population is normal-
ized to one, the instantaneous utility functions are u((1− tw)w + T ) for the
employed workers, u(b+T ) for the short-term unemployed and u(msi+T ) for
the long-term unemployed, where total transfers T are defined by T = B+Π.
More precisely, the budget surplus is defined by:
B = (1− u)
(∫ w
w
[tf (w) + tw]wdG(w)
)
− (us × b + ul ×msi)
Aggregate firms’ profits are defined by:
Π = Y − (1− u)
(∫ w
w
[1 + tf (w)]wdG(w)
)
.
2 Estimation and Test of the Model
This section describes the econometric method we used to estimate the struc-
tural parameters of the model. Because structural econometric models are
sensitive to misspecification, we choose an empirical strategy which ensures
robust estimates of the unknown parameters. As the likelihood function can-
not be derived analytically, it can be replaced by either an approximation
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of the exact function (see Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999) or
Rosholm and Svarer (2004)) or by the exact likelihood function of an ap-
proximated model (Gourie´roux and Monfort (1994)). We choose the latter
strategy and, more specifically, the indirect inference method, which allows us
to run a simple global specification test of our model.14 The benefit derived
from testing the model, however, comes at the cost of making parametric
assumptions.
2.1 Estimation method
The indirect inference method consists of replacing the computation of an-
alytic moments with simulations. The moments underlying the estimation
are based on wage distributions. We focus on a sub-sample of full-time man-
ual workers, who are affected by the minimum wage and the probability of
being excluded from the unemployment benefit system. This enables us to
detect the dimensions along which our simple structural model is capable of
mimicking a set of moment restrictions.
The vector Φ (dim(Φ) = 17) contains all the parameters of the model:
Φ = {he, hs, hl, ζ, γ, s, δ, σ, b, msi, r, tw, tf , pk, α, A, A1}
where the parameters {α, A,A1} characterize the production function such
that f(k) = A1 +(k +A)
α. We choose this particular production function to
simplify the estimation procedure. Indeed, it implies that a worker without
training has a strictly positive inherited productivity. We choose a value of
A such that k(xc) = 0
15.
The parameter σ denotes the risk aversion of the workers: u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ
.
Finally, the parameter ζ denotes the elasticity of the matching function H =
vζ(hee + hsus + hlul)1−ζ .
We restrict the size of the vector of unknown structural parameters:
Θ = {α, pk, he}
The absence of empirical evidence for these key parameters of the model
motivates this choice. The estimation of the vector Θ is conducted under the
following set of restrictions:
• A first vector Φ1, with dim(Φ1) = 7, defined by
Φ1 = {s, δ, σ,msi, r, tw, tf}
14See Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) or Gourie´roux and Monfort (1994) for
a general presentation of these methods. See Collard, Feve, Langot, and Perraudin (2002)
for an applied study.
15We have verified that the capital is always positive in all the simulations.
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is fixed on the basis of external information.
1. The destruction rate s comes from Cohen, Lefranc, and Saint-Paul
(1997): s = 0.0185.
2. The parameter δ is chosen so that the average short-term unem-
ployment spell corresponds to the benefit duration, i.e. 30 months,
(δ = 1/30).
3. Microdata suggest that σ = 2.5 is an admissible value (see At-
tanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999)).
4. The minimum income msi is fixed at its 1995 institutional value:
FF 2,500 (French Francs, FF hereafter).
5. The annual interest rate is fixed at 4%.
6. Payroll taxes on labor tf and tw for firms
16 and workers are set
at, respectively, 40% and 20%.
• The second vector Φ2, with dim(Φ2) = 6, defined by
Φ2 = {b, hs, hl, A1, γ, ζ}
is calibrated, using the model restrictions, to reproduce some stylized
facts and assumptions:
1. The unemployment replacement rate (b/E(w)) is fixed at 0.6, ac-
cording to Martin (1996).
2. The unemployment rate u equals 15.51%.
3. The ratio of long-term to short-term unemployed workers ul/u is
45.75%.
4. The condition of free entry in the labor market is respected (no
sunk costs linked to the creation of a vacancy).
5. Hiring costs γθ/λ(θ) equal 0.3 as in Mortensen (2003). These costs
correspond approximately to 2.5% of wages (Abowd and Kramarz
(1998)).
6. The minimum wage is fixed at a level consistent with the historical
French experience (see CSERC (1999)). For a one percent fall in
the minimum wage, 14,000 jobs are created. This leads to a value
of ζ equal to 0.21.
16Payroll subsidies are introduced when we examine the implication of the French policy.
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Given the set of moments, calibrated parameters and policy functions,
the estimation method is conducted as follows:
Step 1: The vector of moments ψ is estimated by minimizing the following
loss function:
QN = hN(wi; ψN)
′ΩNhN(wi; ψN)
where ΩN is a positive definite weighting matrix and N denotes the size of
the sample. {wi}′ represents the s-dimensional set of wages paid to each
manual worker i in the 1995 set of observed random variables. The choice of
ψ moments is a critical step in the estimation method, but it is not driven
by the model’s specification. Rather, it should encompass as many data
features as possible to avoid an arbitrary choice and reduce estimation biases.
Therefore, we choose a set of moments that fully explain wage densities. In
our case, h(.) takes the form
h(wi; ψ) = E

wi − µ
(1[wi<D1]wi − µ1)
(1[Dn≤wi<Dn+1]wi − µn+1)
(1[D8≤wi<D9]wi − µ9)
 for n = 1, .., 7
where Dn denotes the wage deciles n = 1, ..., 9. The estimated moment µ is
the average wage in the sample, and µn is the average wage between the Dn
and Dn + 1 deciles. This minimal set of moments allows us to capture the
shape of the observed wage density.
Step 2: Given the vector of structural parameters Θ, the simulated wage
density is computed from the set of equations defining the theoretical model.
Step 3: An estimate Θ̂ for Θ minimizes the quadratic form:
J(Θ) = g′NWN gN
where gN =
(
ψ̂N − ψ˜N(Θ)
)
, WN is a symmetric non-negative matrix defining
the metric, ψ̂N is the vector of the estimated moments {µ, µ1, ..., µ9}, and
ψ˜N(Θ) denotes the set of moments implied by the model simulations.
Steps 2 and 3 are conducted until convergence i.e. until a value of Θ
minimizing the objective function is obtained.17
17The minimization of the simulated criterion function is carried out using a Nelder-
Meade minimization method provided in the Optim matlab numerical optimization tool-
box. At convergence of the Nelder-Meade method, a local gradient search method was
used to check convergence.
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A preliminary consistent estimate of the weighting matrix WN is required
for the computation of Θ̂N . It can be based directly on actual data and, here,
corresponds to the inverse of the covariance matrix of
√
N(ψ̂N − ψ0), which
is obtained from Step 1.
For the purpose of identification, we impose the condition that the number
of moments exceeds the number of structural parameters. Thereby, we can
conduct a global specification test along the lines of Hansen (1982), such that
J − stat = NJ(Θ), which is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square, with
a degree of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions.
Beyond these traditional statistical tests, we use a simple diagnostic test
that locates the potential failures of the structural model. Each element of gN
measures the discrepancy between the moments computed from the data and
those computed from model simulations. A small value for a given element
in gN indicates that the structural model is able to account for this specific
feature of the data, while large values may reveal some failures. Collard, Feve,
Langot, and Perraudin (2002) show that a statistic measuring the gap with
a particular moment and its simulated counterpart, denoted “Diag. Test”,
is asymptotically distributed as a N (0; 1).
2.2 The Empirical Performances of the Model.
We use data from the 1995 French Labor Force Survey (“Enqueˆte emploi”).
We consider this year which precedes large structural reforms of the French
labor market and retain only full-time manual workers. Thus, in this partic-
ular case, {wi} consists of the wage set over N = 14202 individuals. Wages,
minimum income and unemployment benefits are expressed in 1990 French
Francs (FF).
Table 1 reports estimates for the structural parameters and the global
specification test statistic (J−stat). The model is not globally rejected by the
data, as the P-value associated with the J−stat is 97.65%. A second feature
that emerges from Table 1 is that all structural parameters are estimated with
precision. In the following paragraph, we discuss the model implications for
this set of parameter estimates.
In the step following the global specification test, we check the struc-
tural model’s ability to reproduce empirical moments. We obtain observed
and simulated values of moments (Table 2). First, all observed moments
are significant so that this set of historical moments is a sufficient table of
experience to test our model. Secondly, Table 2 shows that the simulated
moments are also estimated with precision.18 In addition, they match their
18Wages are expressed in 1990 Francs, using a deflator equal to 1.116.
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Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Θ Θ̂ σ̂(Θ) t− stat
α 0.7158 0.0310 23.0790
pk 18.2866 1.2814 14.2706
he 0.5265 0.0147 35.7266
J − stat 1.6519 P-value 97.65%
empirical counterparts relatively well: the diagnostic test (Diag. Test) does
not lead to rejection of the model in terms of its ability to reproduce each
moment.
Table 2: Estimated Moments for Simulated and Observed Data
ψ Observed Value Simulated Value
ψ̂N σ̂(ψ̂N) t− stat ψ˜N(Θ̂) σ˜N(ψ(Θ̂)) t− stat Diag. Test
µ 6304.6799 31.8464 197.9718 6319.2527 19.0075 332.4608 0.5703
µ1 4471.7044 293.7155 15.2246 4451.1934 14.3953 309.2121 -0.0699
µ2 4872.3694 353.0800 13.7996 4764.8030 29.8411 159.6725 -0.3057
µ3 5262.4871 333.6157 15.7741 5065.5219 48.9270 103.5323 -0.5968
µ4 5587.0088 424.3939 13.1647 5413.1365 71.3006 75.9200 -0.4156
µ5 5884.5128 405.4031 14.5152 5831.3677 97.9160 59.5548 -0.1351
µ6 6253.6900 430.6652 14.5210 6314.1084 128.5709 49.1099 0.1470
µ7 6659.0716 458.8081 14.5138 6859.8255 304.5044 22.5278 0.5850
µ8 7141.5660 492.0757 14.5131 7481.8172 308.9332 24.2182 0.8884
µ9 7850.6070 538.7721 14.5713 8180.0314 246.1776 33.2282 0.6874
This model’s ability to match the observed wage distribution using French
data is in keeping with the Rosholm and Svarer (2004) empirical study on
Danish data, based on an alternative empirical methodology developed by
Ridder and Van den Berg (1997) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
2.3 The Quantitative Features of the Model
The estimation results reveals some quantitative features of the model which
deserve to be emphasized.
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A Binding Minimum Wage. With reference to the estimated support
of the wage distribution, we find that the lower bound of this support is the
minimum wage (without an imposition on our part). Indeed, the estimated
results (see Table 3) show that the actual French minimum wage (mw) is
above the highest reservation wage (xs). It is a binding minimum wage,
which implies F (xs) = 0.
Table 3: Benchmark Equilibrium
Labor market stocks and flows
u ul us heλ hsλ hlλ
0.1551 0.071 0.0841 0.0801 0.1520 0.0395
Employment and Unemployment Durations
model data model data
32.22 34.00 14.50 17.00
Productivity, Output and Welfare
P Y W
18575 10006 -106.2556
Production is expressed in 1990 French francs,
duration in months and stocks and flows in percentages
The Unimodal Wage Density. Figure 2 compares the wage distribution
generated by the model and the kernel density estimation of the observed real
wages.19 The model seems close to the observed data and Figure 2 shows
that the model is able to fit the observed wage cumulative distribution, and
more importantly a unimodal wage density, as observed in the data. The
gap between the model and the data can be explained by the low number of
parameters introduced to generate a complete distribution. In Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002), for example, the exogenous distribution of productivity
increases the degrees of freedom. For a policy experiment, we prefer to have
an explicit choice in productivity for each job. As suggested by Mortensen
19Kernel density estimation is a nonparametric technique for density estimation in which
a known density function (the kernel) is averaged across the observed data points to create
a smooth approximation. We use SAS’s KDE procedure.
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Figure 2: Observed and Predicted Wage Distributions
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(2000), the introduction of an endogenous productivity distribution enables
the generation of a unimodal wage density without any exogenous hetero-
geneity.
This result reveals the importance of human capital investments in our
model. The equilibrium search models a` la Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
intrinsically leads to an earnings distribution with increasing densities. Firms
are induced to offer high wages to attract and retain workers. In our model,
high wage offers lead firms to invest in a human capital technology with
decreasing returns. This feature counterbalances the effect of the increasing
wage density. The estimation results show that, owing to this mechanism we
may obtain a unimodal wage distribution.
Contact probabilities. As shown in Table 3, the estimation of the model
implies that the probability of a worker having a contact with a firm when
employed is lower than the average contact probability when unemployed.
Moreover, the employed probability estimate is lower than the exogenous
destruction rate. These results are consistent with other estimations: Ridder
and Van den Berg (1998) (Dutch data), Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg
(1999) (French data), Rosholm and Svarer (2004) (Danish data) and Bowlus,
Kieffer, and Neumann (2001) (US data). Our estimated rates of contact are
close to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) results: 0.0801 compared to 0.057
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for the employees and 0.1520 compared to 0.124 for unemployed workers.
Interestingly, the long-term unemployed workers have the lowest proba-
bility of having a contact with a firm. The comparative advantage of the
unemployed workers in the search activity is not permanent: this reflects the
well-known stigmatization of the long-term unemployed workers in the hir-
ing process (see Manning and Machin (1999)). Hence, contrary to Flinn and
Mabli (2006)’s assumption, a higher unemployment rate does not necessarily
lead to a higher efficiency in the matching process.
The results summarized in Table 3 also show that the model does a good
job in replicating employment and unemployment duration, respectively 34
(32.2) and 17 (14.5) months in the data (model). It is particularly impor-
tant to replicate the employment duration as it plays a crucial role in the
investment decisions.
Our empirical strategy leads to results consistent with studies based on
non-parametric estimations of the likelihood function. These results are also
consistent with empirical models relying on an exogenous productivity dis-
tribution. This gives us strong support for using the estimated investment
rule in policy experiments.
3 Reassessing the French Labor Cost-Reduction
Policy
The French experience offers the opportunity of evaluating the low-wage sub-
sidy policy suggested Phelps (1994). Previous works (Kramarz and Philip-
pon (2001), Cre´pon and Desplatz (2002)) assessed this policy based only on
its implication for employment. In contrast, our analysis incorporates both
employments effects and productivity effects owing to endogenous human
capital formation.
During the 1990s, tax exemptions on employer-paid payroll taxes (tf )
were introduced in France to lower labor costs. This policy aimed to counter-
act the negative impact of minimum wage legislation on employment without
lowering wages earned by employees. The subsidy increased dramatically in
October 1995 and September 1996 (hereafter PTE, for Payroll Tax Exemp-
tions). In its current state, it corresponds to a linear reduction spanning
from 1 to 1.33 times the minimum wage and ranging from 18.6 points at the
minimum wage (mw) to roughly 0 points at the end point of the exemption
interval.
We first verify that our model performs particularly well at predicting
a higher concentration at the bottom of the wage distribution following the
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subsidy policy. Secondly, in order to evaluate the welfare cost of the binding
minimum wage, we determine its optimal level with and without the produc-
tivity channels. We then investigate the efficiency implications of the recent
payroll tax subsidy policy aimed at reducing the negative employment effect
caused by minimum wage legislation. The policy is free of the reservation
wage limit of a decreasing wage cost, as employees do not suffer from earnings
cuts. We pay particular attention to the productivity effect of this policy.
This allows us to reveal that there is an optimal range of subsidized wages
which better accounts for the trade-off between employment and productiv-
ity.
3.1 The importance of the investment channel
In this paper, we propose a model where the productivity is endogenous
instead of positing heterogenous firms’ productivity, as in Flinn (2006) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) for instance. It introduces an investment
effect in parallel with a job-to-job effect to explain the average productivity
variations. In this Section, we show that this model performs better at
explaining the shift in the wage distribution observed in France at the end
of the nineties as depicted in Figure 1. To make this comparison, we also
estimate an exogenous productivity model on the same sample (in 1995)
and compare the predictions of the two models in terms of the implied wage
distribution when using policy parameters corresponding to 199820, ie. the
payroll tax scheme and the minimum wage in 1998.
The search equilibrium model with an exogenous productivity distribu-
tion extends the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model by taking into ac-
count endogenous labor demand behavior through a stochastic matching a`
la Pissarides (1985). The stochastic component of productivity is observed
after the match and is match specific. This model is close to Flinn and Mabli
(2006), except for the wage contract and the two types of unemployed worker
we assume in order to take into account the search efficiency heterogeneity
between the unemployed workers. Hence, this model shares all the features
of our benchmark model, except for the productivity: f(k) becomes Ψ + p
where the component of the productivity that is specific to the match (p) is
distributed according to a Gamma law (see Appendix C for more details).
We follow exactly the same econometric strategy used to estimate the
model with endogenous productivity. We estimate three parameters, related
to the productivity distribution and the search friction: the two parameters
20We consider this year just before the reduction in weekly working hours policy, which
has implemented additional payroll tax exemptions.
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of the Gamma law (ν and κ) and the search efficiency of the employed workers
(he). On the other hand, all the other parameters in Φ1 and Φ2 are calibrated
according to the same restrictions.
The estimation results of the exogenous productivity model are displayed
in Appendix C.2. The result obtained on the 1995 sample shows that we
cannot reject the model at 10% level. Table 9 shows that all the structural
parameters are significant. The “Diag. Tests” shown in Table 10 suggest
that the estimated model with exogenous productivity is able to match all
the historical moments.
We have now two models able to explain the wage distribution observed
in 1995. A test is then to compare their predictions of the impact of the
subsidy policy on the wage data in 1998. We then estimate both models,
using the 1998 sample, by imposing the same structural parameters as in
1995 in order to test the restriction Θ̂1998 = Θ̂1995: this gives the J − stat
of the constrained models (Jc). This statistic follows a χ
2 with 10 degrees
of freedom (we reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space to zero).
When productivity is endogenous, the parametric restrictions are not rejected
at 5% level (see Table 11 in Appendix D). All the predicted moments are not
significantly different from their empirical counterparts. On the contrary, the
analogous parametric restrictions are rejected in the model with exogenous
productivity. The “Diag. Test” allows us to detect the main failure of this
model: the average wage in the sample and the average wages in the deciles
higher than the median are largely over-estimated.
The fraction of the jobs paid at under 1.33 times the minimum wage
before and after 1995 summarizes these estimation results. In the French
Labor Force Survey, this proportion appears to have increased from 37.83%
in 1995 to 45.33% in 1998. It is particularly important to be able to generate
similar changes with our estimated model. We find that this fraction is
40.31% for our benchmark 1995 estimated model and increases to 45% when
the exemption policy is introduced. Conversely, the exogenous productivity
model predicts that less workers are paid under 1.33 times the minimum
wage (34.71% in 1995 against 34.3% in 1998).
Indeed, the decrease in the labor costs leads to more vacancies and to
more job-to-job transitions. In an exogenous productivity search equilib-
rium, these latter imply a higher concentration at the top of the wage distri-
bution. In the endogenous investment model, this mechanism, due to more
job-to-job transitions, is also effective, but is dominated by the investment
effect. As firms expect a decrease in the job duration, they choose to adjust
accordingly their wage and investment policy. They decrease both their hu-
man capital investment and their wage offer. This contributes to explain the
higher concentration at the bottom of the wage distribution.
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The two models provides markedly different responses to the increase in
job-to-job transitions. In the model with endogenous productivity, the rate
of job-to-job flows is equal to 2.3% in the benchmark equilibrium and 2.41%
after the PTE reform. In the model with exogenous productivity, the job-
to-job transition rates are equal to 2.26% and 2.40% before and after the
PTE reform. It is important to emphasize that this increase is also present
in the data. From the French Labor Force Survey, it appears that the rate of
job-to-job transitions associated with positive wage changes21 has increased
from 1.94% in 1995 to 2.25% in 1998. These statistics give some support to
the view that the PTE reform, by reducing the expected labor costs, has led
to more competition between firms, and then to more job-to-job transitions.
Finally, the wage offer strategies in the investment model lead to similar
wage distribution changes as those observed. This result validates our overall
approach and our estimation strategy.
3.2 A Benchmark Case: The Optimal Minimum Wage
As in any matching model, a decrease in the minimum wage leads to a higher
vacancy rate and hence to a higher employment level (denoted E). But, in
general equilibrium, it can be offset by an increase in vacancy costs. As is
often observed in matching models, a higher vacancy rate induces a standard
congestion effect and potentially prohibitive hiring costs. In addition, and
more specifically for this framework, it can lead to an underinvestment in
human capital due to the increased probability of finding a better job and
the reduction of the expected job duration.
By means of simulations, we show that the optimal minimum wage is
(i) lower than its 1995 value and (ii) larger than the reservation wage xs.
Actually, the optimal level for the minimum wage is around 88% of its 1995
value when considering the output criterion (Figure 3, ∆ Output) or 86%
according to the welfare indicator (Figure 3, ∆ Welfare). The large decrease
in unemployment leads to more lump-sum transfers received uniformly by all
agents. The evaluation of aggregate welfare takes this effect into account and
leads to a lower minimum wage. The difference between the two indicators,
however, is not significant (see Table 4).
The optimal minimum wage is output-increasing because of the reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate (see Table 4). The decrease in human capital
investment made by firms compensates in part for this last effect. By con-
sidering the decision rule (eq. (2)), it appears that the decrease in the labor
21In order to control for the wage increases, we divide all the wages by the mean wage
of the corresponding year.
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Figure 3: Optimal Minimum Wage
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market tightness due to the fall in wage costs reduces the expected dura-
tion of jobs, regardless of the level of wages offered: the higher the number
of vacancies, the higher the probability that employees have a contact with
another firm. In turn, firms are deterred from investing in human capital
as they anticipate shorter job duration. This negative productivity effect on
net output is reinforced by the increase in training costs due to additional
job-to-job transitions.
Table 4: The Optimal Minimum Wage Level
mw Y E E(k) P W B
-12% 0.4140 2.1698 -2.0186 -1.0981 1.0330 2.0761
-14% 0.4020 2.4133 -2.2440 -1.2214 1.0402 2.2408
Variations in % relative to the benchmark calibration
It is worth examining the case where the investment channel is removed.
We set that the investment choice of firms for different wage levels is given
by the benchmark calibration of the economy. In contrast with the previous
case, a higher vacancy rate has a positive impact on average productivity
(Table 5). Faced with potentially more frequent quits, firms react by offering
higher wages, and more job-to-job transitions increase the proportion of high-
wage and high-productivity jobs in the economy. Thus, average productivity
shifts up due to a considerable composition effect. For the optimal 12%
decrease in the minimum wage, average human capital stock and average
productivity increase respectively by 8.6904% and 4.5071% (Table 5). Of
course, more vacancies induce additional costs. Considering production net
only of hiring costs accounts for all these effects in a consistent manner.
By using this net indicator, we verify that eliminating the human capital
investment margin leads to additional gains (Table 5): 6.0908% compared to
0.3117%. Maintaining the human capital level constant on every job is not
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sufficient to eliminate the productivity channel in our theoretical setup. It is
necessary to remove the wage offer game effect on productivity by considering
the case where average productivity is given by its benchmark value (in Table
5, P constant line). The matching effect internal to our model still applies.
In this scenario, the rise in net production (1.4397%) is situated between
the results of the previous two cases. This analysis confirms that there are
two distinct productivity channels in our setup: an investment one and a
job-to-job transition one.
Table 5: Constant or Variable Productivity – ∆mw = −12%
E × P − γv E E[k] P
ki variable 0.3117 2.1698 -2.0186 -1.0981
ki constant 6.0908 2.1698 8.6904 4.5071
P constant 1.4397 2.1698 - -
Variations in % relative to the benchmark calibration
Based on our optimal minimum wage analysis, the labor cost reduction
must be relatively weak to preserve high productivity levels. Moreover, de-
creasing the minimum wage is inherently limited by the high short-term reser-
vation wage, despite the existence of acceptable lower wage offers. Hence,
payroll tax exemption policies may have more dramatic consequences when
they are not restricted by the reservation wage limit, given that employees
do not suffer from a reduction in earnings.
3.3 Re-examining the Payroll Tax Subsidy Policy
The French strategy of reducing labor costs through a payroll tax subsidy
policy has been already evaluated in terms of employment: Cre´pon and De-
splatz (2002) and Kramarz and Philippon (2001) find that this policy gen-
erates strong employment effects. The subsidies, however, tend to introduce
a bias in favor of the creation of low-wage jobs and a potentially large de-
crease in aggregate productivity. Hence, a policy evaluation that includes
output is particularly interesting, compared to one based solely on employ-
ment. Indeed, two fundamental motives exist for re-examining this subsidy
policy through the productivity channel. The first reason is derived from
similarities in the studied case (supra) regarding the decrease in the mini-
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mum wage and is based on the fact that lowering the labor cost leads to more
vacancies and rotations and, hence, to less human capital investment. The
second motive is specific to the form of the subsidy policy. Tax exemptions
applied to only between 1 and 1.33 times the minimum wage have the po-
tential to induce a bias towards low wages. For instance, Malinvaud (1998)
recommends widening the range of exemptions at the expense of lowering
the tax reduction to the minimum wage level.
The remainder of this section examines the impact of the existing subsidy
policy on employment and productivity. We then determine the optimal
range of exemptions from a set of the same linearly decreasing exemptions
scheme, which implies the same ex ante budgetary cost.
3.3.1 The Payroll Tax Exemption Reform
Table 6 highlights the results relative to the PTE reform. The policy increases
the net production in the economy brought about by the large employment
boost (as evidenced by the two point drop in unemployment). It succeeds
in generating additional vacancies and job creation in the economy. The
employment scale effect obtained here is consistent with other econometric
studies on this topic (Kramarz and Philippon (2001); Cre´pon and Desplatz
(2002); Laroque and Salanie´ (2000) and (2002)). It must be noticed that the
increase in the labor market tension leads to a decrease in the proportion of
long-term unemployment. This feature contributes to improving the search
efficiency in the economy. Human capital investment, however, contracts
and capital stock decreases by 2.1233% and then the average productivity by
1.1469%. Note that this decrease in productivity is in the confidence interval
of the estimation provided by Crepon and Desplatz (2002).
Contrary to the minimum wage case, the subsidy policy, as it is targeted
at the low wages, may induce a negative productivity effect due to a distrib-
ution effect which would then reinforce the investment channel. We evaluate
the magnitude of these effects by comparing the variable productivity case
with the constant investment one. The composition effect decreases the av-
erage human capital E[k] and the average productivity P in the ki constant
case compared to the variable case (Table 7). This decline, due to the biased
exemptions scheme, is particularly significant since higher rotations per se
lead to a strong positive productivity effect (Table 5) when human capital
investments are considered as given. The decline is further exacerbated if
instead the investment varies, because of the decrease in human capital in-
vestments following higher rotations in the economy. It is worth emphasizing
that this last effect dominates the composition effect. It is only when aver-
age productivity is maintained artificially unchanged that the PTE reform is
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Table 6: The PTE Reform
Labor market stocks and flows
u ul us heλ hsλ hlλ
0.1358 0.0581 0.0778 0.0904 0.1718 0.0446
Employment and Unemployment Durations
model Bench. model Bench.
31.75 32.22 12.36 14.50
Variations (in %)
Y E P W B
0.4080 2.2768 -1.1469 1.1793 -0.9302
Duration is expressed in months and stocks and flows in percentages
as efficient in increasing the net (only of hiring costs) production (1.4960%
gain) as the optimal decrease of the minimum wage (1.4397% gain).
Table 7: Constant or Variable Productivity
E × P − γv E E[k] P
ki variable 0.3165 2.2768 -2.1233 -1.1469
ki constant 1.2125 2.2768 -1.3373 -0.2686
P constant 1.4960 2.2768 - -
Variations in % relative to the benchmark calibration
While the PTE reform implies some direct budget cost, the welfare cri-
terion can lead to a less optimistic evaluation22. Despite this budget cost,
the PTE reform implies an increase in welfare (∆W=1.1793%, Table 6) rela-
tive to the benchmark economy, but also, and more unexpectedly, compared
22The exemptions do not constitute the total budget variations: it is necessary to also
take into account the reduction in unemployment benefits and the increase in payroll taxes
collected from the employment boom.
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to the optimal minimum wage level (∆W=1.0402%, Table 4). As long as
the minimum wage is reduced to its optimal value, the employee value falls
because of the decrease in the average wage. Introducing payroll tax exemp-
tions, however, requires taking into account the decrease in dividends and
in government lump-sum transfers. This decrease is spanned over all agents,
yet the decrease in the minimum wage only concerns those employees at the
bottom of the wage distribution. If the instrument is payroll taxes subsi-
dies, the fall in employment costs for low-wage workers is supported by all
agents. Alternatively, if the instrument is the minimum wage, the incidence
applies only to low-wage workers. Given the concavity of the utility function,
these changes in the distribution of total earnings are not neutral: the tax
exemptions policy is considered superior to a decrease in the minimum wage.
3.3.2 Policy Choices: Targeting Subsidies around the Minimum
Wage or Spreading over a Larger Range?
Do the PTE reforms lie on the optimal range of exempt wages? We take as
given the shape of the policy and its direct cost. Our model is particularly
well-suited for studying the consequences of this kind of policy. There is an
explicit trade-off for a given budget cost: either the subsidies cover a narrow
range and greatly reduce labor costs or they are spread over a larger range
to avoid a downward distortion of the wage distribution.
The PTE reform is an intermediate scenario between a policy which con-
centrates all exemptions at the minimum wage level and one which spreads
payroll tax exemptions over the entire wage distribution. The first case mag-
nifies the positive employment effect and the negative productivity impact.
Table 8 shows that the balance is clearly against this policy. The second case
tries to attenuate job allocation distortion, but at the expense of the magni-
tude of the labor cost decline: only 2.65 points of payroll tax exemptions are
possible to maintain the same budget cost as the PTE reform. Thus, this
policy is overshadowed by the PTE reform, even if the human capital stock
is higher (Table 8).
Table 8: Comparison with Two Extreme Cases
Y W E E(k) P
PTE Reform 0.4080 1.1793 2.2768 -2.1233 -1.1469
Uniform exemptions 0.1505 0.1965 0.4633 -0.4323 -0.2342
Exemptions at the mw -0.3738 0.1355 3.7240 -3.2394 -1.5667
Variations in % relative to the benchmark calibration
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Given the same ex ante (direct) budget cost, the question remains whether
we should further increase the subsidy at the minimum wage level or, on the
contrary, spread out the subsidy over a wider range. However, the policy-
maker faces uncertainty about the model parameters. We use the estimated
covariance of the model parameters as a measure of this uncertainty. By
mean of simulations23, ie. the random draw of parameter values from their
estimated law, we compute the confidence interval of the output and welfare
changes shown in Figure 4. Let us note that the confidence interval is not
very large which demonstrates the robustness of our policy results.
Figure 4: The Optimal Subsidy Scheme
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It appears that the strategy of concentrating the subsidies more at the
minimum wage level is output-reducing. More precisely, with regard to the
production criterion, the optimal subsidy scheme increases continuously from
0% for jobs paid more than 1.36 times the minimum wage to 16% for jobs paid
at the minimum wage (see Figure 4). With respect to the PTE reform, this
particular shape optimally solves the trade-off between employment and pro-
ductivity: net output increases by 0.4123%. Employment rises less (2.0961%
in this case, 2.2768% in the case of the PTE reform), but capital falls at a
lower rate (-1.9540% in this case, -2.1233% in the case of the PTE reform).
Limiting the analysis to the employment side only would suggest using con-
centrated exemptions around the minimum wage level. This paper shows
that the conclusion dramatically changes when the productivity impact is
considered. In this framework, spreading out exemptions over a wider distri-
bution range appears more efficient.
By adding the welfare criterion, the analysis considers the concavity of the
utility function and grants more importance to the decline in unemployment.
Accordingly, the optimal scheme ranges up to 1.27 times the minimum wage,
allowing more exemptions at the minimum wage level.
23The simulation method is presented in Appendix E, as the distribution of the parame-
ters used in the model simulations (Figure 5). The computation of this confidence interval
takes 60 hours with a 2 MHZ Pentium 4 for 150 simulations and 23 policy schemes.
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Regardless of the selected criteria, the optimal profiles are extremely sim-
ilar to that of the PTE. In conclusion, the balance between the reduction of
labor costs and the wage range covered by exemptions is nearly perfect. This
analysis lends strong support to the PTE reform implemented in France in
the 1990s.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use the French experience of subsidizing low-wage em-
ployment to evaluate the performance of this policy which was suggested
by Phelps (1994). Our contribution is to build a search equilibrium model
incorporating human capital investments which allows us to conduct policy
experiments after estimating this structural model on French data. We are
able to replicate the heterogeneity of the observed wage distribution for low-
skilled workers in France during the 1990s. The empirical analysis gives some
relevance to the underlying endogenous productivity distribution generated
by training investments at the firms’ level.
We then show that a payroll tax subsidy policy on low-wage workers stim-
ulates employment and output without increasing wage inequality. In con-
trast to a reduction in the minimum wage, this policy is welfare-improving
for the risk-averse workers, as it increases the probability of employment
without worsening the situation of the low-wage workers. However, this fa-
vorable outcome occurs only if the subsidy policy is well-balanced between
lowering labor costs and widening the wage range covered by the exemp-
tions. Concentrating all exemptions at the minimum wage level maximizes
the positive employment effect, but leads to strong negative productivity ef-
fects which imply a decrease in the output. The optimal scheme ranges up
to 1.3 times the minimum wage, close to the effective design of the French
policy. This gives a reason beyond stigmatization (Katz (1996)) to prefer
broadly targeted subsidies. On the contrary, limiting the analysis to the em-
ployment side would suggest using concentrated exemptions at the minimum
wage level. This paper shows that the conclusion dramatically changes when
the productivity impact is considered.
Finally, our results argue for seriously considering the subsidy policy on
low-wage workers as an efficient tool for preserving a high level of welfare.
They highlight the significance of the trade-off between employment and
productivity inherent to this policy. This trade-off may also be worthy of
serious consideration in future evaluations of labor market institutions.
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A An Extensive Definition of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined by the following set of equations:
u =
s
(
hlλ(θ) + δ
)
hlλ(θ) {hsλ(θ) [1− F (xs)] + δ}+ s (hlλ(θ) + δ)
us = u
hlλ(θ)
hlλ(θ) + δ
ul = u
δ
hlλ(θ) + δ
u((1− tw)xs + T )
= u(b + T ) + (hs − he)λ(θ)
∫ w
xs
[V n(w˜)− V us] dF (w˜)− δ [V us − V ul]
u((1− tw)xl + T )
= u(msi + T ) + (hl − he)λ(θ)
∫ w
xl
[
V n(w˜)− V ul] dF (w˜)− s[V us − V ul]
γθ
λ(θ)
=
hl
h
ul
(
s + heλ(θ)
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)]
)
×(
maxw≥xl,k≥0{f(k)− (1 + tf (w))w − pkk(r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)])}
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)]
)
∀ w ∈ [xl, xs]
γθ
λ(θ)
=
s
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)] ×(
maxw≥xs,k≥0{f(k)− (1 + tf (w))w − pkk(r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)])}
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)]
)
∀ w ∈ [xs, w]
f ′(k) = pk(r + s + h
eλ(θ)[1− F (w)]) ∀ w ∈ [xl, w]
T = B + Π
B = (1− u)
(∫ w
w
[tf (w) + tw]wdG(w)
)
− (us × b + ul ×msi)
Π = Y − (1− u)
(∫ w
w
[1 + tf (w)]wdG(w)
)
This system allows us to determine the equilibrium unemployment rate ul, us
and u ≡ ul+us, the vacancy rate given that v ≡ θh, the reservation wages xl
and xs, the distribution of the wage offer F (w) and the associated investment
in human capital for each wage k = k(w).
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B Proofs of the Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
• If w = xs and F (xs) = 0, θ is given by the equation (1) and is such
that
γθ
λ(θ)
=
(
s
s + heλ(θ)
)(
f(k(w))− (1 + tf (w))w − pkk(w)(r + s + heλ(θ))
r + s + heλ(θ)
)
Evaluated for w = w, we find that θ solves the following equation,
stemming from the fact that f(k(w)) = f(K(θ)) where k(w) ≡ K(θ) =
f ′−1(pk(r + s + λ(θ))):
γθ
λ(θ)
=
(
s
s + heλ(θ)
)(
f(K(θ))− (1 + tf (w))w − pkK(θ)(r + s + heλ(θ))
r + s + heλ(θ)
)
Let us denote
Φ(θ) =
γθ
λ(θ)
Ψ(θ) =
(
s
s + heλ(θ)
)(
f(K(θ))− (1 + tf (w))w − pkK(θ)(r + s + heλ(θ))
r + s + heλ(θ)
)
,
then Φ(0) = 0, Φ′(θ) > 0 due to the constant returns to scale of the
matching function, Ψ(0) =
(
s
s+heλ(θ)
)(
f(K(0))−(1+tf (w))w−pkK(0)(r+s)
r+s
)
>
0 and Ψ′(θ) < 0. As in Mortensen (2000), two solutions exist: the first is
at θ = 0 and the second at some strictly positive value θ > 0. Only the
positive solution is stable because a simple entry process starting with
positive vacancies is sufficient to find the only one positive equilibrium
value of θ. This implies that there exists only one positive equilibrium
value of v.
• If w = xl, θ is given by the equation (1) but is now such that
γθ
λ(θ)
=
hl
h
ul
(
f(K(θ))− (1 + tf (w))w − pkK(θ)(r + s + heλ(θ))
r + s + heλ(θ)
)
given than k(w) ≡ K(θ) is defined as in the preceding case. Let us
denote
Ψ˜(θ) =
hl
h
ul
(
f(K(θ))− (1 + tf (w))w − pkK(θ)(r + s + heλ(θ))
r + s + heλ(θ)
)
Since ul is decreasing in θ, then Ψ˜(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ. As
in the previous case, this implies that there exists only one strictly
positive vacancy rate v.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of the discontinuity of the wage distribution follows the one pro-
posed in the seminal paper of Mortensen (1990). Let us denote by κ(w) =
(1 + tf (w))w the wage costs and pi(w) the following profit flow:
pi(w) = f(k(w))− pkk(w)(r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)])
• For any w ∈ [xl; xs[, the intertemporal expected profit associated with
a filled job is given by:
hl
h
ul
(
s + heλ(θ)
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)]
)(
pi(w)− κ(w)
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w)]
)
(3)
Evaluating this expression for w = x−s ,we have:
hl
h
ul
(
s + heλ(θ)
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (x−s )]
)(
pi(x−s )− κ(x−s )
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (x−s )]
)
(4)
• Now, given that w = xs from the definition of G(w) over w ∈ [xs, w],
the intertemporal expected profit turns out to be:
s
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (xs)]
(
pi(xs)− κ(xs)
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (xs)]
)
(5)
Comparing equations (4) and (5) for x−s → xs, we find that (4)<(5) as
long as heλ(θ)[1−F (xs)]+ s > 0 which is guaranteed until s > 0. This
shows that there is no wage offer over the interval [x−s , xs[.
• There must exist a critical wage offer wl such that there is no wage offer
over the interval [wl, xs[. This critical point of the wage distribution can
be derived by equalizing the condition (3) evaluated for w = wl with the
condition (5) and by taking into account the restriction F (xs) = F (wl):
γθ
λ(θ)
=
hl
h
ul
(
s + heλ(θ)
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (xs)]
)
×(
pf(k(wl))− (1 + tf (wl))wl − pkk(wl)(r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (xs)])
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (xs)]
)
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C A model with exogenous productivity
C.1 The model
The model builds on both Pissarides [1985] (stochastic job matching) and
Burdett and Mortensen [1998] (endogenous wage dispersion).
(H1) The matching-specific productivity shock p is distributed according to
the function Φ(p).
(H2) This shock is observed when the worker meets the firm. It is an un-
known parameter for unemployed workers and for vacant jobs.
(H3) Wage posting is assumed.
(H4) There are no counteroffers.
C.1.1 The matching process
Because all firms and workers are ex-ante identical, the reservation produc-
tivity is common to all job-worker pairs.
If p ≥ p⋆, where p⋆ denotes the productivity level associated to the mini-
mum wage, the contact is acceptable. The mass of these acceptable contacts
is: ∫ pmax
p⋆
dΦ(p) = 1− Φ(p⋆)
The rate of job matching is now
[1− Φ(p⋆)]H = [1− Φ(p⋆)]h(v, hee + hcuc + hlul)
Let θ = v
h
be the labor market’s tightness, the workers’ arrival rates of wage
offers are :
• for the employees heλ(θ) ≡ he[1− Φ(p⋆)]H (θ, 1)
• for the short term unemployed hcλ(θ) ≡ hc[1− Φ(p⋆)]H (θ, 1)
• for the long term unemployed hlλ(θ) ≡ hl[1− Φ(p⋆)]H (θ, 1)
The transition rate at which vacancy jobs are filled is:q(θ) ≡ [1−Φ(p⋆)]H (1, θ−1)
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C.1.2 The free entry condition
The net worth of a vacancy satisfies:
rV = max
w(p)≥w(p⋆)
{∫ pmax
p
η(w(pi)) [J(w(pi), pi)− V ] dΦ(pi)− γ
}
η(w(p)) is the probability at which a vacancy with posted wage w(p) is filled.
When the minimum wage is binding, implying that w ∈ [w, w], the free entry
condition leads to:
V = 0
=⇒ γθ
λ(θ)
= max
w(p)≥w(p⋆)
{∫ pmax
p
[
s
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w(pi))]
]
J(w(pi), pi)dΦ(pi)
}
C.1.3 The optimal wage policy when the minimum wage is bind-
ing
Ex-ante, the match-specific productivity is unknown. The firms’ behavior
is to offer a wage contingent to this match-specific productivity. When the
minimum wage (w) is binding, the productivity threshold (p⋆) is given by:
w(p⋆) = w
where w(p) is the optimal wage policy. In this case, the distribution of wage
offers is defined on the support [w(p⋆), w(p)].
Because the number of contacts does not vary across employer type (the
job-worker productivity is observed after the match: the hiring policy is not
specific to each level of productivity), the distribution of productivity is given
by the exogenous distribution Φ(p). Nevertheless, when the minimum wage
is binding, only the jobs with productivity higher than p⋆ are open. Then,
the effective wage offer is defined by:
F (w(p)) =
∫ p
p⋆
dΦ(p)dp
1− Φ(p⋆) ≡ Ψ(p|p
⋆)
Thus, we have F (w(p⋆)) = 0 and F (w(p)) = 1. The net worth of a filled job
satisfies:
rJ(w(p), p) = p−(1+cf )w(p)−heλ(θ)[1−F (w(p))][J(w(p), p)−V ]−sJ(w(p), p)
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Given the value of J(w(pi), pi), we obtain:
γθ
λ(θ)
= max
w(p)≥w(p⋆)
{∫ pmax
p
[
s
s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w(pi))]
] [
pi − (1 + cf )w(pi)
r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w(pi))]
]
dΦ(pi)
}
The optimal wage policy is given by the first order condition of this preceding
equation:
1 =
heλ(θ)F ′(w(p))(p− (1 + cf )w(p))[2(s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w(p))]) + r]
(1 + cf )(s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w(p))])(r + s + heλ(θ)[1− F (w(p))])
C.1.4 The labor market equilibrium when the minimum wage is
binding
Because the exogenous distribution of productivity is given by Ψ(p|p⋆), we
have then, as in Burdett and Mortensen:
F (w(p)) = Ψ(p|p⋆) =⇒ F ′(w(p))w′(p)dp = Ψ′(p|p⋆)dp
Then, the equilibrium is defined by the ordinary differential equation:
w′(p) =
heλ(θ)Ψ′(p|p⋆)(p− (1 + cf )w(p))[2(s + heλ(θ)[1−Ψ(p|p⋆)]) + r]
(1 + cf )(s + heλ(θ)[1−Ψ(p|p⋆)])(r + s + heλ(θ)[1−Ψ(p|p⋆)])
and the boundary condition:
w(p⋆) = w
where w denotes the minimum wage, and
γθ
λ(θ)
=
∫ pmax
p⋆
[
s
(s + heλ(θ)[1−Ψ(pi|p⋆)])
] [
pi − (1 + cf )w(pi)
(r + s + heλ(θ)[1−Ψ(pi|p⋆)])
]
dΨ(pi|p⋆)
For the estimation, we assume that the match-specific productivity is
distributed according to a Gamma law:
dΦ(p) =
ν
Γ(κ)
e−ν×p(ν × p)κ−1 for any p > 0
ν and κ are the parameters of this law. The mean and the variance are
respectively defined by E[p] = κ
ν
and V [p] = κ
ν2
.
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C.2 The estimation of the exogenous productivity model
Table 9: Parameter Estimates
Θ Θ̂ σ̂(Θ) t− stat
κ 0.9411 0.1315 7.1595
ν 1.1183 0.1796 6.2281
he 0.5114 0.0113 45.4295
J − stat 2.8378 P-value 89.96%
Table 10: Estimated Moments for Simulated and Observed Data
ψ Observed Value Simulated Value
ψ̂N σ̂(ψ̂N) t− stat ψ˜N(Θ̂) σ˜N(ψ(Θ̂)) t− stat Diag. Test
µ 6304.6799 31.8464 197.9718 6289.6130 22.7696 276.2281 -0.6767
µ1 4471.7044 293.7155 15.2246 4359.3163 8.9935 484.7164 -0.3828
µ2 4872.3694 353.0800 13.7996 4739.8764 40.3434 117.4882 -0.3777
µ3 5262.4871 333.6157 15.7741 5200.6041 77.6937 66.9373 -0.1907
µ4 5587.0088 424.3939 13.1647 5659.1424 109.3241 51.7648 0.1759
µ5 5884.5128 405.4031 14.5152 6104.6313 132.2298 46.1668 0.5744
µ6 6253.6900 430.6652 14.5210 6533.9895 145.1352 45.0200 0.6913
µ7 6659.0716 458.8081 14.5138 6936.6026 305.3923 22.7137 0.8105
µ8 7141.5660 492.0757 14.5131 7339.2174 315.3176 23.2756 0.5232
µ9 7850.6070 538.7721 14.5713 7758.4723 99.6657 77.8450 -0.1740
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D Predicted wage distribution
Table 11: Estimated Moments for Simulated (with the constrained models)
and Observed Data - 1998
Moment Observed Value Simulated Value
Endogenous productivity Exogenous productivity
ψ̂N ψ˜N(Θ̂1995) Diag. Test ψ˜N(Θ̂1995) Diag. Test
µ 6505.1504 6521.5245 0.7864 7052.5779 31.5854
µ1 4730.3603 4763.2306 0.4980 4665.6881 -0.1997
µ2 5102.3379 5079.3009 -0.0617 5112.0418 0.0261
µ3 5445.3872 5337.1379 -0.3145 5591.5995 0.4259
µ4 5740.1521 5605.2864 -0.2978 6083.6376 0.8542
µ5 6058.5190 5909.1613 -0.3648 6707.0210 1.7676
µ6 6424.6373 6370.9246 -0.1147 7302.3660 1.8783
µ7 6831.4614 6973.5853 0.3100 7867.7548 2.2708
µ8 7325.7920 7653.2857 0.6262 8438.3322 2.2874
µ9 8022.8530 8409.9622 0.7065 9039.2092 2.4260
Jc 3.9445 10298.1249
P-value 94.98 0
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E Policy evaluation and uncertainty on the
structural parameters
For a given PTE reform (characterized by a level of tax exemption at the
minimum wage), S steady state equilibria are computed. Each steady state
s is associated with a particular draw of the structural parameters Θs, for
s = 1, ..., S. The values of the parameters Θs are randomly drawn in a
multivariate normal law of mean the estimated vector Θ̂ and of variance the
estimated covariance matrix Ω̂(Θ). Hence, we have:
Θs Ã N
(
Θ̂, Ω̂(Θ)
)
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the parameter values used in the model
simulations in order to compute the confidence interval of the output and
welfare changes. For each of the policy rules, we compute S output and
Figure 5: The distribution of the structural parameters
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aggregate welfare measures. We define the confidence interval at 95% by
excluding the top- and bottom-2.5 percent extreme values.
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